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The aim of this study is to examine the role of collectivism and uncertainty avoidance 
on the effectiveness of the family firms’ corporate governance. The role of family on 
corporate governance is still inconclusive. Collectivism and uncertainty avoidance 
culture on family firm is a part of the value of the family firm can strengthen or weaken 
the corporate governance implementation. Based on social cognitive theory, the 
environment influences the individual’s belief or value in which become individual 
guidance in the ethical behaviour. This study uses the two method of data collection: 
archival and survey. This result supports the hypothesis that collectivism and 
uncertainty avoidance will weaken the effectiveness of corporate governance 
implementation. The result has implication that value in society has to consider on the 
policy or guidance formulation for more effective implementation.     
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In normative paradigm, law enforcement be able to decrease the managers’ 
opportunistic behavior, such as corporate governance as a mechanism to decrease the 
aggressiveness of management’s behaviour on earnings management. However, La 
Porta et al. (2000) stated that country with weak investor protection has a unique 
mechanism to protect the investor, such as concentrated shareholder in family (family 
ownership). It has implication that control from large shareholders be able to decrease 
the opportunistic behavior of managers (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
The study about the role of family shareholders on financial reporting is still 
inconclusive. In the one side, based on alignment approach, family ownership has lots 
of encouragement to publish a quality financial reporting (Wang, 2006). In the other 
side, based on entrenchment approach, as majority shareholders, the family attempts 
to obtain private benefit by expropriating minority shareholders (Fan and Wong, 2002; 
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Setia-Atmaja et al., 2008). Prior research shows that family shareholders hire CEO 
from their family members (Claessen et al., 2000), but the CEO still has two options; 
align with shareholders’ interest or take opportunity to maximize utility. In 
appearance, CEO is controlled by majority shareholders, but in fact, there is a 
possibility that the control of shareholders to CEO inconsistency.  
The inconclusive result encourage a research question, whether the value of 
collectivism and uncertainty avoidance culture on the family firm can influence the 
ethical behaviour of manager. This study is based on social cognitive theory that an 
environment sorrounding individual will influence or construct the individual’s belief 
or value and it becomes a guidance the individual’s behaviour (Bandura, 1988; Patel, 
2003 and 2009). Therefore, the aim of this research is to achieve the empirical evidence 
about the role of culture in weaken or strenghten the negative relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings manipulation.  
This study uses two dimensions of culture; collectivism and uncertainty 
avoidance (Hofstede, 1997). Culture is identified through survey in family firms and 
is interacted with the corporate governance practice of family firms. The measurement 
of corporate governance implementation uses shareholders right, corporate 
governance policy, disclosure practice and policy, and the role of audit committee. 
This study uses the earnings manipulation of Jones’s formula (1991).  
The results of this study support hypothesis that collectivism culture and 
uncertainty avoidance culture decrease the effectiveness of corporate governance 
implementation. This first contribution is empirical evidence about the role of 
environment in formulating corporate governance guidelines in order to fit with the 
business environment. This study also contributes to agency theory literature 
especially empirical evidence about agency conflict in family firms. The third 
contribution is empirical evidence of social cognitive theory as basis of dilemma 
decision. The paper is organized into five sections; introduction is in first part, then 
followed by the literature review and hypotheses development, the third part is 
research method, the next part contains explanation and discussion of the results of the 
study, and conclusion and limitation of the study is in the end the paper. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1. Literature Review 
1. Corporate Governance and Earnings Manipulation 
The essence of corporate governance mechanism is to overcome conflict between 
managers as an agent and shareholders as a principal (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The 
managers’s behavior can not be monitored perfectly to make sure the managers will 
behave as shareholders’ interest and the ownership of shares is widely dispersed 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Klein et al., 2005). Each shareholders also has different 
expectation toward to corporate, hence, corporate governance becomes one of the 
monitor mechanism to control the managers’ shirking behavior (Chan and Cheung, 
2012).  
Some empirical evidences reveal that the corporate governance mechanism, 
such as ownership structure and board composition, has effect to managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour, such as conservatism, earnings manipulation, and disclosure 
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quality (Huang et al., 2012; Tangjitprom, 2013). Huang et al. (2012) states that the 
insider shareholders and institutional shareholders have positive effect to the level of 
earnings forecast conservatism. In country level, the study is conducted by DeFond et 
al. (2007) also reveals that an annual earnings announcement in countries with low 
earnings quality provides the less informative earnings. Therefore, this situation has 
deteriorated the investor assurance to the quality of financial reporting and then has 
caused depreciation of Indonesian exchange rate and economic crisis in 1997 
(Johnson, 2000).  
The Indonesian economic crisis in 1997 has forced Indonesian Government 
to develop a corporate governance guideline. Indonesia adopted that guideline from 
Organization for Economic Cooperation Development (OECD) and it has been revised 
several times until 2004 as the last version guidelines (KNKG, 2006). The guideline 
offers five principles, namely transparency, accountability, responsibility, 
independency, and fairness. The guideline can be used as foundation for the good 
corporate governance iimplementation to achieve the high corporate sustainability, 
compliance, environment and social responsibility, value, and competitiveness 
(KNKG, 2006). Corporate governance implementation in Indonesia is a voluntary or 
unpunished activity, so achieving good corporate governance depends on 
management’s commitment.  
However, LaPorta et al. (1997) stated that Indonesia is categorized as country 
with low investor protection. Indonesia is also categorized as country with the high 
level of earnings management behaviour because of the low investor protection level 
(Leuz et al., 2003). During 2002 until 2009, Indonesia faces many finance scandals, 
such as Timah Ltd. in 2002, BNI and Lippo Banks in 2003, and Century Bank in 2009. 
Even, BNI Bank that has won the best tenth award of good corporate governance from 
the Indonesian Institute for Corporate Governance in 2002 also faced the financial 
scandal.  
In particular, the OECD’s guideline of corporate governance adopted by 
Indonesia was designed on the assumption that the company owned by the widely 
dispersed shareholders (Chen and Nowland, 2008). Contrast with the ownership 
characteristic in Indonesia, the low investor protection level in Indonesia is responded 
by shareholders with holding the major of shares by family (LaPorta et al., 1998). 
Claessen et al. (2000) reveal that ownership structure of publicity traded companies in 
Indonesia is dominated by family. The evidence showed that family controls 71.5% of 
shares and the remaining shares are owned by corporations 13.2%, states 8.7%, public 
5.1%, and financial institutions 2.0%. There are 53.4% firms in Indonesia owned by 
controlling owner alone, so no other shareholders or second shareholders have more 
than 10%. Surprisingly, management include CEO, board chairman, or vice chairman 
from the controlling family own 84.6% firms in Indonesia, so high opportunity for the 
alignment paradigm may happen in Indonesia. 
The alignment theory predicts that family ownership has more incentives to 
publish good quality of financial statements, becuase the family shareholders concerns 
with reputation, survival, wealth, and legacy for their descendant (Wang, 2006). Wang 
(2006) also stated that pointing of CEO by family increases the alignment of interest 
between both of them, so it can decrease agency problem. Empirical evidence states 
that the family firms have higher earnings quality than non-family firms (Ali et al., 
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2007; Wang, 2006). Management feels reluctant to manipulate the company’s 
financial reporting (Ali et al., 2007). The ownership of family in firm can control their 
manager behaviour directly (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The family also has 
information and understand about the company’s activities deeply (Andersen and 
Reeb, 2003).  
The other illustration about the characteristic of family ownership in 
Indonesia is the authority of family shareholders in Annual Shareholders Meeting 
(ASM). The majority shareholders have significant role to the company’s activities 
indirectly as stated by Company Act no. 40/2007. This Act is published by Stock 
Exchange Authority (SEC in United Stated). One of rule in this Act states Annual 
Shareholders Meeting (ASM) have the highest authority to decide company policy, 
such as dividend policy, hire and dismiss organs of company, such as: board of 
commissioners, board of directors, auditor independent, and audit committee. When 
family own the most of shares, so family as majority shareholders fully involves in 
decesion making or policy through ASM include pointing board of commissioners as 
their representative in company. ASM also officially has right to receive or refuse 
management annual reporting.  
The asumption of OECD formulation might not match for the whole company 
conditions as in Indonesia, especially for companies that most of its shares are owned 
by family or family firms. Ali et al. (2007) stated that the ownership structure 
determines the level of the agency problems. A conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management is a problem for the widely ownership companies, while 
in concentrated companies such family firms, the conflict of interest is between 
majority and minority shareholders. The condition indicates the corporate governance 
guidelines that are formulated by OECD might not match with the Indonesian business 
and social environment. Hence, adopting the corporate governance rules from another 
country may not be appropriate when the business and social environment between the 
two countries are different.   
The second assumption about the family’s ownership is stated by 
entrenchment theory that the earnings quality of family firms is lower than non-family 
firms (Fan and Wong, 2002; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2008). This theory states that as 
majority shareholders, family shareholders maximize their utility by expropriate 
minority through private benefit (Setia-Atmaja et al., 2008; Claessens et al., 2000). An 
expropriation is the distribution of wealth from the other party, such as minority 
shareholders, to majority party because the majority has a private benefits over the 
minority. For that reason, to achieve private benefit, the strategy of majority 
shareholders to achieve private benefit hires CEO from their family members 
(Claessens et al., 2000; LaPorta et al. 2000). The CEO can be controlled and will 
publish financial information as family interest (Fan and Wong, 2002).  
 
2. Social Cognitive Theory and Corporate Governance Implementation  
Social cognitive theory is used by Bandura (1988) to explain an individual’s behavior 
in organization. The environment surrounding individual has significant role to 
develop the individual’s cognitive and behavior. The interaction between informasi 
from the individual’s environment with individual’s knowledge and ability creates an 
individual’s guidance in which individu relies on to achieve his/her goals. According 
Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol. 8, Supplementary Issue 1 183 
 
Copyright  2019 GMP Press and Printing (http://buscompress.com/journal-home.html) 
ISSN: 2304-1013 (Online); 2304-1269 (CDROM); 2414-6722 (Print) 
 
to opportunistic behavior of managers, the social cognitive theory implies that 
managers, although his/her behavior is controlled by shareholders or board of 
commisoners such in Indonesia, still have an authority to behave unethically. The 
enviroment, such as culture, has important role to influence managers to choose ethical 
behavior rather than unethical behavior. Kaasa and Vadi (2007) stated that culture 
influences people’s belief and behavior which can contribute or block the process of 
development and implementation of new ideas.  
Patel (2003 and 2009) also states that the decision to do ethical behavior does 
not depend on a set of rule or universal of values, but individual relies on culture as 
the specific characteristic of designed practice and operation of corporate in global 
environment. Patel (2009) gives ilustration of Ringov and Zollo’s empirical evidence 
(2007) that the higher power distance, higher individualism, higher masculinity, and 
higher uncertainty avoidance have effect to the lower social performance. Braun and 
Rodriguesz, Jr. (2008) also states that culture is a part of the business and social 
environment that may affect the effectiveness of the corporate governance practice. 
Therefore, cultural values of certain society will be changing depend on the changing 
of politic, social, or environment surrounding the society (Ting and Ying, 2013).  
Culture is collective phenomena which studied and implemented by people 
in the particular society (Hofstede, 1997). Hofstede (1997) did survey to IBM 
employees around the world and based on the survey, culture is classified into four 
perspectives, i.e. power distance (from small to large), individualism versus 
collectivism, femininity versus masculinity, and uncertainty avoidance (from strong to 
weak). Indonesia, according to Hofstede (1997), is categorized as high/large power 
distance that shows power inequality between different level of authority such as 
superior and subordinate, high collectivism that shows group as a central of individual 
objective, masculinity that shows the admiration of strength and hero, and low/weak 
uncertainty avoidance that shows the level of society’s effort to avoid anxiety and 
ambiguity in managing life.  
In accounting context, the social values are related to the development of 
accounting system at the subculture level (see figure 1) (Gray, 1988). Guan et al. 
(2005) also creates relationship between Hofstede’s social culture and Gray’s 
accounting values. As illustration, country with higher individualism and lower 
uncertainty avoidance tends to more likely be professional. In turn, according to Braun 
and Rodriguez, Jr. (2008) culture influences accounting value and accounting practice. 
Guan et al. (2005) reveals that country with high individualism tends to increase 
earnings manipulation, because the society recognizes the individual professional 
judgment, flexibility in accordance the individual company environment, more likely 
to disclose or open information, and optimistic in uncertainty future events. Other 
empirical evidence showed by Kaasa and Vadi (2007) that higher power distance, 
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Figure 1: Dimension of Culture and Gray’s Accounting Value and Practices 
Source: Braun dan Rodriguez, Jr (2008) 
 
 
2. 2. Hypothesis Development 
 
1. Collectivism on Corporate Governance Implementation  
The individualism - collectivism is a dichotomy; one side is individualism and other 
side is collectivism. The higher individualism has the lower collectivism, but this study 
prefers to mention high or low collectivism. Important to understand, that there are 
two meaning of collectivism culture that relates to value and dependence. Kaasa and 
Vadi (2007) state that the both meaning of this culture causes the difficulty to 
summarize what implication is in decesion making policy.    
Guan et al. (2005) states that higher collectivism encourages lower 
profesionalism, higher uniformity, higher conservatism, and higher secrecy. 
Profesionalism relates to maintan individual profesional judgment, uniformity relates 
to consistency with practice or standard, conservatism relates with preference for the 
uncertainty of future events, and secrecy relates with the preference to restrict the 
information. Kaasa and Vadi (2007) has opinion that the higher collectivism creates 
lower openess of mind.       
The level of collectivism is also the degree of dependence individual into 
his/her groups (Desender et al., 2011; Chan and Cheung, 2012). Chakrabarty (2009) 
reveals that collectivism has positive correlation with domination of family in 
company or family concentrated ownership. This culture brings consequence, that 
his/her group has a cohesive force that is implied each people protects their group 
beyond to unquestioned loyalty, such as managers loyal to majority shareholders, 
therefore higher collectivism level lead to higher earnings management level 
(Desender et al., 2011).   
Chakrabarty (2009) states that the collectivism culture in family firm decreases 
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individualism will be showed by the greater solidarity and cohesion among members 
of families. It means the collectivism culture will maintain ownership of their dynasty 
in their business. Wang (2006) states that pointing of CEO by family shareholders 
increases the alignment of interest between both of them, because family shareholders 
directly can control their managers (Demsetz dan Lehn, 1985) and can dirrectly access 
information or understand about company activities (Andersen dan Reeb, 2003). As 
consequence, managers will feel reluctant to manipulate earnings (Ali et al., 2007).  
According to collectivism values, as stated by Gray (1988), managers will 
comply with his/her family or society guidance, managers will be loyal and respect to 
his/her family or society, and managers only rely on family or society’s judgment 
rather than his/her profesional judgment. As the social cognitive theory, environment 
influence the belief or value of managers, such as in Indonesia. Managers also loyal 
and respect to the family shareholders as the majority shareholders in company that 
have highest authority to determine company’s policies, such as pointing boards of 
director member through boards of commissioners, by the annual meeting of 
shareholders.  
It has implication that managers will not implement the good corporate 
governance because manager is less likely to behave professional. Manager shows the 
high responsibility or loyalty toward to the majority shareholders’ interest. Moreover, 
managers will encourage the management members to support his/her loyalty through 
alignment with other orporate organs. Based on the characteristic of collectivism 
culture,  the hypothesis is formulated as below:  
 
H1: Higher collectivism culture will weaken the negative relationship between 
corporate governance implementation and earnings manipulation behavior.   
 
2. Uncertainty Avoidance on Corporate Governance Implementation  
The uncertainty avoidance culture refers an effort of society to decrease the uncertainty 
in managing their life. In countries with higher uncertainty avoidance tend to rely on 
more precise laws to minimize ambiguity (Chen and Cheung, 2008; Hofstede, 1997). 
Guan et al. (2005) states that the high uncertainty avoidance values are showed by 
uniformity (versus flexibility), conservatism (versus optimism), secrecy (versus 
transparency), and statutory (versus professionalism). As ilustration, uniformity value 
indicates consistency with accounting standard, so accounting practice flexibility 
according to the circumstance is intolerable. Statutory value also indicates compliance 
to legal requrements and no professional judgment maintanance. As consequences, the 
society tends to conservative and to be secrecy to avoid legal punishment. Francis and 
Wang (2008) show empirical evidence that investor protection law can impose client 
big 4 auditors to publish high earnings quality. Big 4 auditors reluctant to face the law 
consequences becasue of a failure in client misreporting detection.     
Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have opinion that corporate governance 
mechanism is also one of an effort investor to aviod from the uncertainty return. 
Agency theory assumes that agent (managers) will be opportunistic from shareholders 
or act on their own interest. However, the written contract between agent and 
shareholders can not overcome agency problem because right and obligation of 
managers can be detailed in that written contract explicitly.  
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Such as, US and UK are categorized by LaPorta et al. (1998) have a high 
investor protection indicates the good corporate governance implementation, because 
the protection can avoid the opportunistic behavior of managers. Implicitly, the higher 
uncertainty avoidance has more opportunity to improve the effectiveness of good 
corporate governance, because the society who has the value tends to open their mind 
for positive ideas in decreasing ambiguity (Chen and Cheung, 2008). Contrast with 
societies in lower uncertainty avoidance value, rules, law, or standards can be violated 
because of pragmatic reasons, moreover, conflicts and ambiguity are interesting and 
considered as a natural part of life (Kaasa and Vadi, 2007).  
Indonesia is categorized by Hofstede (2001) as low uncertainty avoidance 
culture. La Porta et al. (1998) also categorize Indonesia as a country with low investor 
protection law. Classen et al. (2000) and La Pota et al. (1999) argue that low investor 
protection is responded by family concentrated shareholders. The shareholders from 
family can control the manager’s behaviour directly (Demsetz dan Lehn, 1985) and 
has information or understand about company’s activities deeply (Andersen dan Reeb, 
2003), because as majority shareholder, family want to control management by hires 
CEO from their family member (LaPorta et al., 1999). Family shareholders also 
concern reputation, survival, wealth, and legacy for their descendants of their firm 
(Wang, 2006).  
According to the social cognitive theory, the family concentrated ownership 
is a special characteric of environment sorrounding managers to decrease opportunistic 
behavior. The environment characteristic is different with US and UK that have high 
legal enforcement because of dispersed ownership. Managers reluctant to behave 
opportunistic, because control from family shareholders has more pervasive impact to 
managers’ behavior than law, such as investor protection law.  In implies that the level 
of uncertainty avoidance culture has no effect to corporate governance 
implementation. As ilustration, family shareholders as majority have control to 
corporate manager through the annual meeting of shareholders. Majority shareholders 
also have board of commisioner who involves in corporate activity to control managers 
daily activies. If managers behave less opportunistic because of the power of majority 
shareholders, so the hypothesis below shows the important role of the majority 
shareholders to create good atmosphere in corporate governance implementation 
rather than that corporate governance itself. This study predicts that the level 
uncertainty avoidance has no effect to effectiveness of corporate governnace. Based 
on this argument, the hypotesis is stated as below:   
 
H2: Higher uncertainty avoidance culture will weaken negative relation between 
corporate governance implementation and earnings manipulation behavior.   
 
 
3. RESEARCH METHOD 
 
3. 1. Data collection and Sample Selection 
This research uses two types of data: secondary data and primary data. The secondary 
data is collected from Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for measuring abnormal 
accruals and scoring corporate governance implementation, meanwhile, the primary 
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data is collected by survey for identifying the collectivism and uncertainty avoidance 
value of company. Measurement abnormal accrual uses financial report from 2008 – 
2010 in which financial statement 2008-2009 as basis of estimation of abnormal 
discretional accruals in the year 2010. Scoring corporate governance uses annual report 
2010. Survey was conducted in 2010, but questionnaire are receive gradually until the 
middle of 2012. This study only uses annual report 2010 for scoring corporate 
governance implementation, because this score is not significant different from year 
to year and the ownership of sample does not change significantly.     
The scoring of corporate governance is based on guidelines released by 
Indonesia Government. The samples are the family firms that their shares publicize in 
Indonesia Stock Exchange, except financial and service companies. The financial and 
service companies are excluded from the sample because they have unique criteria and 
heavily regulated by the government authority body. This study traces the ownership 
of listed company in IDX and other news, such as newspaper, internet, that publishes 
about sample. This study only uses firms that owned by individual or family more than 
10%. 
3. 2. Measuring Corporate Governance Score (CGS). 
Corporate governance scores of family firms, as an independent variable, will be 
counted based on items extracted from the company’s annual report 2010. The study 
only uses 30 items from 112 questions of corporate governance guidelines released by 
Forum for Corporate Governance in Indonesia (FCGI) in 2002. The 30 items include 
six questions relate to shareholders rights, six questions for corporate governance 
policy, eight questions for corporate governance practices, eight questions for 
disclosure practice and policy, and two questions for the role of audit committee. The 
rest of the questions in corporate governance guidelines (82) such as report meeting 
between board of director and board of commissioner are not included in corporate 
governance score because of un-accessibility for this study. 
  
3. 3. Identifying Culture (CLT)  
Culture variable is a moderating variable which influences the strength of the 
Corporate Governance Score (GCGS) and Earnings Manipulation (DA) relationship. 
The family firm culture is unique, so the study has to perform by survey. There are 
two kinds of culture that are examined; collectivism level (CCLT) and uncertainty 
avoidance level (UACLT). The questions of survey are adopted from König et al. 
(2007) and Hofstede (1997). Because questions of survey have to be in Indonesian 
language, so this study translates the original version to Indonesian version. 
Translation into Indonesia version and back to original version is done three times and 
pilot test is also done three times to make sure questions in questionnaire suitable with 
the original version.  There are three questions for measuring of collectivism or 
individualism level, and three questions for measuring of uncertainty avoidance level. 
The questionnaire is distributed to 15 respondents for each head office and each branch 
office of sample, so the amount of respondent in each firm is 60 respondents.    
The questions of questionnaire emphasize in participant’s perception about 
cultural environment in where he/she works. Their perceptions are indicated using five 
points of Likert Scale from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (5). The company’s 
culture is scored by ratio of total scores of all respondents in the related company for 
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each dimention of culture. The highest collectivism score is 15 and the lowest score is 
5, and the highest uncertainty avoidance score is 15 and the lowest score is 5.  
 
3. 4. Measuring Earnings Manipulation (DA) 
Earnings quality as an independent variable is measured by the level of discretionary 
accruals (Jones model, 1991). This study uses financial data of sample firms from 
2008-2009 to estimate the abnormal discretionary accruals. The primary model for 




In which,  
• TA is the total accruals defined as TAit = EBXIit – CFOit; EBXI is earnings 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations, and CFO is the 
operating cash flows. 
• Assetit-1 is total assets, 
• ∆SALESit is the changes in revenues from the preceding year, and 
• PPEit is the gross value of property, plant and equipment.  
 
The coefficients estimated from (1) are used to determine the firm-specific normal 




Finally, the discretionary accruals is the difference between total accruals and the fitted 
normal accruals, defined as DAit  = (TAit/Asseti,t-1) – NAit and uses data in year 2010.  
 
3. 5. Control Variables 
We proposed to use leverage which is measured by liabilities and assets ratio of firm 
i, because high liability can encourage company to manipulate earnings.   
3.6. Statistical Model  
According to the hypothesis, the coefficient of β4 must have a positive sign and β5 
must have a positive too. If the sign is positive, it means that the interaction between 
corporate governance score and culture will strengthen the negative relationship 
between corporate governance and culture, and opposite. This study predicts that 
corporate governance has negative relationship with discretionary accruals because it 
indicates the effectiveness of corporate governance implementation in family firms.  
 
DAi=  β0+β1CGSi+β2CCLTi +β3UACLTi + β4CGSi*CCLTi +β5CGSi*UACLTi 
+β6LEVi+εi  (1) 
 
In which: 
DAi discretionary accruals of firm i  
CGSi Corporate Governance Score 
  (1) 
   (2) 
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CCLTi Collectivism Culture Score 
UACLTi Uncertainty Avoidance Culture Score 




4.1. Statistic Descriptive 
There are 166 non-financial companies listed in IDX and there are 112 family firms in 
which family or individual own shares between range 12.83% to 99.75% of the 
companies’ shares. Financial statement do not publish individual or family 
shareholders, the 112 family firms are collected by tracing the name of ownership until 
find the individual or family through internet, newspaper, magazines, and other 
information, such as advertisement that show relationship between shareholders.  
Unfortunately, in Indonesia is common that people do not use his/her family 
name, except in certain race or people who was born after 19801. Therefore, similar 
name does not indicate that has family relationship. There are 74 companies that 
should be eliminated from sample, because of some reasons, such annual reports could 
not be accessed from IDX, companies are in outside Java Island that imposible to 
survey, or head office and branch office owned or managed by different shareholders. 
Finally, survey is conducted to 38 firms and respondents from 34 firms complete the 
questionnaire (see table 1).     
 
Table 1: Sampling Process 
Non-financial companies listed in IDX (Indonesia Stock Exchange) 166 
The firms’ shares owned by individual or family between range 
12.83% to 99.75% 
122 
Companies’ annual report that can’t be accessed from IDX, 
companies are outside Java Island, different ownership or 
managament between head and branch office 
74 
The research samples  38 
The companies did not return the questionnaire 4 
Final sample for analysis 34 
 
Before survey is conducted, researchers need to know from corporate 
secretary or HRD official what the requirements or procedures to distribute 
questionnaire is. The sample address can be access in IDX through fact book. 
However, some addresses does not match with the IDX data, so information is got 
from internet or from branch office that is visited first before head office. All of sample 
firms want to receive questionnaire directly from researchers, because they also want 
to know the detail of this study, such as objective, contribution, etc., although 
researcher send questionnaire together with research proposal. HRD official distribute 
and collect the questioners, so regularly researchers ask to HRD official to make sure 
all questionnaire are collected by HRD official.  
                                                 
1 It is common in Indonesia culture that a  baby is given  his/her own name by his/her parents  or no 
family name,  such as Supriyadi as the 3rd author; no family name is in his name.     
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To anticipate the influence of region culture, survey is conducted at the head 
office and at three branch offices that locates in different provinces with the head 
office. For example: if the head office is in Semarang city (Middle Java Province), 
survey also is conducted at branch office like Surabaya city (East Java Province), 
Jakarta city (Jakarta Province) and Jogjakarta city (Jogjakarta Province), vice versa. 
The distribution to the fourth city is also  based on the fact that the cities are the 4 
biggest cities in Java Island. The total of respondents is at least 60 respondents in each 
sample firm; 15 for head office, 45 for three branch offices.      
The mean score for collectivism is 10.84 with standard deviation of 1.78. The 
highest collectivism score is 14.3 and the lowest score is 4.1. The result suggests that 
the collectivism level spreads to sample firms. Finally, the mean score for uncertainty 
avoidance is 11.18 with standard deviation is 1.64. The highest score is 13.3 and the 
lowest score is 4.2.  
 
Table 2: The Descriptive Statistics of Variables 
 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
CCLTi 34 4.1 14.3 10.840 1.78 
UACLTi 34 4.2 13.3 11.179 1.64 
GCGSi 34 129 209 171.12 20.73 
DAi 34 -0.14 0.142 0.0037 0.0724 
LEVi 34 0.1250 2.3111 0.5630 0.3817 
 
 
Corporate governance score are collected from annual reporting and 
discretionary accrual data are collected from financial statement. Each item in 
corporate governance formula has value between 1 to 10 in which 10 means the firm 
obey the corporate governance rules (the best) and 1 for otherwise (the worst). The 
total maximum corporate governance score is 320, if firm obey the all of corporate 
governance rules.  
The result of descriptive statistic shows that the mean of corporate governance 
score is 171.12 with standard deviation is 20.73. The result also shows that minimum 
corporate governance score is 129 and the maximum corporate governance score is 
209. The result of descriptive statistic shows that the mean of discretionary is 0.0037 
with the standard deviation is 0.0724. The lowest score is -0.14 that shows 
manipulation earnings through decreasing accruals and the highest score is 0.142 that 
shows manipulation earnings through increasing accruals.  
The study tests the hypotheses using two types of data, primary and secondary 
data. The secondary data are the shares ownership, earnings quality, and Good 
Corporate Governance scores. The primary data are gathered by survey for identifying 
the dimentions of owned family companie’s culture. The analysis for hypothesis test 
is based on the available data from 34 companies. Since, the observation data are very 
limited, the study conducts several analysis to provide more assurance on the 
relationships between dependent and independent variables. 
 
 
Review of Integrative Business and Economics Research, Vol. 8, Supplementary Issue 1 191 
 
Copyright  2019 GMP Press and Printing (http://buscompress.com/journal-home.html) 
ISSN: 2304-1013 (Online); 2304-1269 (CDROM); 2414-6722 (Print) 
 
4.2. The Hypothesis Testing 
We consider the rule of thumb for minimum observation, so we test the data with 
the non-parametric test. We performed Pearson correlation analysis to assess the 
relationships among variables of interest. The Pearson correlations between the 
transformed data of interested variables are significant. The coefficient correlations 
between the combining variables of collectivism*GCG score and earnings quality is -
0.446 and significant at 5% confidential level (p-value = 0.015). This result supports 
the hypothesis that collectivism culture significantly weaken the effectiveness of GCG 
implementation as reflected in earnings quality.  
The Pearson correlations between uncertainty avoidance*GCG score and 
earnings quality are significant as shown by the coefficients of -0.404 (-0.398) with 
the p-value of 0.30 (0.32). The coefficient signs shows that higher uncertainty will 
weaken the effectiveness of GCG implementation. Table 3 provides the Pearson 
correlations among all variables.  
Corporate governance variable also has significant negative correlation with 
discretionary accrual. It implies that the implementation of corporate governance will 
reduce the aggressiveness of manager to manipulate earnings. The result supports the 
prior empirical evidences, such as Huang et al. (2012), Tangjitprom (2013), revealed 
the corporate governance mechanism has effect to managers’ opportunistic behaviour, 
conservatism, earnings manipulation, and disclosure quality.  However, collectivism 
culture and uncertainty avoidance culture does not have effect to the discretionary 
accrual. The result may shows the possibility role of culture to the management’s 
behavior. 
 
 Table 3: Pearson Correlation Matrix of Transformed Variable Data 
Description  Trans1_DA 
Trans1_GCGS Pearson Correlation -0.44*** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
Trans1_CCLT Pearson Correlation -0.09 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.66 
Trans1_UCLT Pearson Correlation -0.01 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.97 
Trans1_GCGS*CCLT Pearson Correlation -0.45*** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.02 
Trans1_GCGS*UCLT Pearson Correlation -0.40*** 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 0.03 
   
Note: ***) Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level  
 
 
5. DISSCUSION, CONCLUSION, AND LIMITATION 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine the role of collectivism and uncertainty 
avoidance on the effectiveness of GCG implementation in increasing companies’ 
accountability and transparency through earnings quality. Specifically, the study 
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expects that collectivism and uncertainty avoidance will weaken the effectiveness of 
GCG implementation in improving earnings quality. The direct adoption of the GCG 
guidelines from OECD may cause the failure of GCG implementation in Indonesia 
due to different characteristic environment. The empirical evidence can be considered 
in GCG guidelines in order to fit with the business environment. It also expected to 
increase awareness of investors when they interprete financial statements and make 
investment decision related to family-owned companies.  
The decision to do ethical behavior does not depend on a set of rule or 
universal of values, but individual relies on culture as the specific characteristic of 
designed practice and operation of corporate in global environment (Patel, 2003 and 
2009). Braun and Rodriguesz, Jr. (2008) also states that culture is a part of the business 
and social environment that may affect the effectiveness of the corporate governance 
practice. Therefore, cultural values of certain society will be changing depend on the 
changing of politic, social, or environment surrounding the society (Ting and Ying, 
2013).  
 
The availability of data is the major limitation of the study. When more data 
are available, reexamining the model may provide a better result for assessing the role 
of culture on the effectiveness of GCG implementation. The use of discretionary 
accruals as a mesure of earning quality may confound the results due to mixed 
motivations embeded in descretionary accruals, namely efficient, income smoothing, 
and/or bonus. However, there has been no developed model to separate among 
different motivation of earning management.  
Scoring corporate governance practice only relate to normative aspect, such 
as the number board of commisionner, pointing independent auditor, or the number 
meeting between board of commisioners and board of directors. However, there is no 
information about procedure of financing or investment decison, although this decison 
disclosure in annual report. This procedure is very usefull to understanding the control 
of board of commisioners to board of directors.     
The future research should compare the role of culture between family firms 
and non family firms in the effectiveness of corporate governance in order to 
generalize the role of environment in decision policy. The future research also could 
compare the role of culture between family firms who have control right higher rather 
than cash flow right in effectiveness of corporate governance practice in order to 
understand whether control of majority is consistent. The both of research could be 
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